In this paper we demonstrate how to prove the correctness of systems implemented using lowlevel imperative features like pointers, files, and socket I/O with respect to high level I/O protocol descriptions by using the Coq proof assistant. We present a web-based course gradebook application developed with Ynot, a Coq library for verified imperative programming. We add a dialog-based I/O system to Ynot, and we extend Ynot's underlying Hoare logic with event traces to reason about I/O and protocol behavior. Expressive abstractions allow the modular verification of both high level specifications like privacy guarantees and low level properties like data structure pointer invariants.
Introduction
In an ideal world, web services would be specified with high-level concepts and protocols, and implementations would be proven correct with respect to these specifications. Indeed, there is already much work on verifying web systems at a variety of levels of abstraction. For example, there are formal cryptographic protocols [1] , session typesystems for protocol conformance [18] , taint-analyses for protecting from code injection attacks [19] , and tools for automatically generating low-level data marshaling code [12] . Given the wealth of knowledge about how to verify particular semantic properties, a natural next step is to verify arbitrary properties, or even all properties of interest (functional correctness). In this paper we present a full-spectrum approach to this problem for programs that use general recursion, mutable state, and file and socket I/O. We demonstrate the practicality of our method by building, with minimal overhead, a webbased course gradebook with verified properties ranging from privacy guarantees to data structure pointer invariants.
We use the Coq proof assistant [2] to state specifications, create implementations, and build proofs. The richness of Coq (and systems like it [37, 30] ) enables modular specifications and compositional implementations at arbitrary and varying levels of abstraction. As a result, we can verify both high-level properties (protocol conformance, privacy guarantees, etc.) and low-level properties (data structure invariants, parsing correctness, etc.) in the same tool. Our trusted code base is small, since proofs can be independently and quickly checked by a small type-checker. In this work we have opted to create proofs interactively and semi-automatically during development, using Coq's proof scripting language [13] , but our approach does not preclude external automation (e.g., using automated theorem provers to discharge proof obligations [44] ).
In addition to Coq, we are using the Ynot [34] library for verified, general-purpose, higher-order imperative programming inside Coq. We add a dialog-based [21] I/O system to Ynot, and we extend Ynot's underlying Hoare logic with event traces [5] to reason about I/O behavior. Executable programs are generated by compiling OCaml code extracted from Coq sources and statically linking it with an OCaml implementation of the Ynot axioms [10] . During this process, non-computational content such as specifications and proofs are erased, and Ynot references are compiled to OCaml references, greatly reducing runtime overhead.
Verifying the functional correctness of realistic programs has been a grand challenge in computer science since the 1970's [25] . Our work here demonstrates, through a complete example, the engineering costs and benefits associated with the functional verification of a simple 3-tiered web application, using Coq as a programming and proving environment. Our approach is unique (and, we believe, compelling) in combining an extremely expressive, Turing-complete dependently typed programming language with aggressive proof automation for a trace-and separation-based Hoare logic. Other approaches are discussed in Section 6.
The Gradebook Application
Our web-based course gradebook allows students, teaching assistants, and professors the ability to read, edit, and statistically aggregate grades in a web-browser in a privacy-respecting way. We use a traditional three-tiered web application architecture with role-based privacy, a persistent backend data store, an application logic layer, and a presentation component [35] . A diagram of the application is shown in Figure 1 .
We specify the store using a purely functional implementation of a minimal subset of SQL, including basic select, project, update, insert, and delete commands. We have implemented an imperative store using a pointer-based data structure, but this detail is isolated from the rest of the system by higher-order separation logic [40, 38] .
The application logic specifies the behavior of the gradebook using high-level domainspecific concepts like grades, assignments, and sections, and defines the protocol that makes up a valid web transaction. For example, the specification states that students cannot query each other's grades. Imperative implementations are proven correct with respect to this model.
To users, the gradebook application appears as a regular HTML-based website. The application server parses HTTP requests by compiling a PEG grammar [16] for HTTP to a packrat parsing computation in a verified way [31] . 
Outline
We begin in Section 2 with a brief introduction to the salient aspects of Coq that we leverage in our development. This section is geared primarily for Coq novices and Coq experts should feel free to skip this section. In Section 3 we describe how to use Coq and Ynot to specify and implement application behaviors. We then present the verified gradebook application in Section 4, and discuss its verification overhead. In Section 5 we discuss the extraction process that we use to generate executable code. We conclude with a comparison to related tools, lessons learned, and thoughts on future work. The source code is included in the Ynot distribution at http://ynot.cs.harvard.edu/. For purposes of exposition we will sometimes take obvious notational liberties with Coq code.
Coq Background
The Coq proof assistant, usually referred to simply as Coq, is a tool for constructing programs and machine checkable proofs in the Calculus of Inductive Constructions (CIC) [2] . Coq is based on the Curry-Howard isomorphism which connects types to logical propositions and well-founded functional programs to proofs in constructive logic. This tutorial focuses on three concepts. First, we show how to define inductive data types. Next, we show how to define functions over these data types and how reason about them. Finally, we discuss axiomatic extensions to Coq.
One way to define types in Coq is using inductive definitions. For example, the Coq standard library defines natural numbers using the following inductive definition: first, on line two, states that O is a natural number which we will consider to denote 0. The S constructor on line three states that given any natural number n, S n is also a natural number, which we take to mean the successor of n, i.e. n + 1. Using these constructors, we could write the number 3 as S (S (S O)), though Coq provides notation that allows us to use Arabic numerals directly, e.g. 3. We can use the same approach to define inductive predicates. For example, we can define two mutually inductive predicates that encode when a number is even or odd:
1 Inductive Even : nat → Prop := 2 | EZero : Even 0 3 | ESucc : ∀ n, Odd n → Even (S n) 4 with Odd : nat → Prop := 5 | OSucc : ∀ n, Even n → Odd (S n).
The types of Even and Odd are nat → Prop. This is the type of total functions from natural numbers to logical propositions. Types in the universe Prop, unlike Set, are computationally irrelevant: they can not be used to construct values in Set. Such irrelevance allows proofs to be ignored at runtime.
Even n (and Odd n) are the type of proofs that n is even (or odd). The constructors for these data types form the proof rules for a theory. EZero is the proof that states that 0 is even. ESucc (and OSucc) is the proof rule that takes two arguments, a number n and a proof that n is odd (or even), and proves that S n is even (or odd). Coq uses ∀ to denote a dependent function type where the type of the return value depends on the value of the argument. Note that n binds a variable whose type, nat, is inferred by Coq.
Coq also provides a simple Definition keyword as shown in the following example:
1 Definition pair nat : Set := nat * nat.
2 Definition list nat : Set := list nat.
The first line defines the type pair nat to be the type of pairs of natural numbers using the pair type constructor, * . Using built-in Coq notation, values of this type would be written, e.g., (1, 2) . The second line uses the list type constructor to define a type of lists of natural numbers. In Coq, the empty list is denoted nil while the non-empty list is denoted by :: . For example the list 1, 2, 3 would be written 1 :: 2 :: 3 :: nil . So far we have considered only the definition of types and propositions, but not the mechanism for computing on values or proving propositions. Both of these tasks are accomplished using a strongly normalizing (and total) functional programming language. The following three definitions are proofs that the first three natural numbers are even, odd and even respectively. Here we use the keyword Lemma to signify proofs, though this is simply an alias for Definition.
1 Lemma zero is even : Even 0 := EZero. 2 Lemma one is odd : Odd 1 := OSucc 0 zero is even . 3 Lemma two is even : Even 2 := ESucc 1 one is odd.
As is customary, placing two terms next to one another applies the first to the second. For example, in the second lemma, the constructor OSucc is applied to two arguments, 0 and zero is even.
Since there are an infinite number of natural numbers, proofs about all naturals require induction. Consider the proposition that all natural numbers are either even or odd:
1 Lemma even or odd : ∀ n, Even n ∨ Odd n.
Since we have written a definition without a corresponding body, Coq enters interactive proving mode to assist us in building it. Coq presents the following goal:
∀ n : nat, Even n ∨ Odd n Our proof proceeds by induction on the value of n, which we can specify using the induction tactic. Coq automatically generates an induction principle for every inductive definition; in our case, this tactic applies the induction principle for natural numbers:
1 nat ind : ∀ P : nat → Prop, 2 P 0 → (∀ n : nat, P n → P (S n)) → ∀ n : nat, P n Applying the induction principle results in two new goals: Even (S n) ∨ Odd (S n)
We can prove the first goal by proving the left side of the disjunction and appealing to EZero. For the second goal, we consider whether n is even or odd by performing case analysis on IHn and then appealing to either ESucc or OSucc to prove either Odd (S n) or Even (S n).
At its core, this is the basic process that our verification technique; however, manually proving goals can be tedious. To ease this burden, Coq provides a scripting language, Ltac [13] , to chain together tactics and create customized proof search heuristics that, in practice, can be used to prove many goals. Custom tactics produce Coq terms and are essential to making the verification cost of our approach manageable; we return to this point in Section 3.5.
Sometimes it is desirable or necessary to axiomatize data types and operations, rather than define them outright in Coq. Coq provides the Axiom keyword that we can use, for example, to axiomatize real arithmetic 1 :
Here we axiomatize real and real plus which are respectively the type of real numbers and the addition over real numbers. We may use these two axioms to write programs with real addition, but in order to reason about our programs, we need various properties. On line three we show one such property, that real plus is commutative. In the rest of the paper, we use axioms as the basis for imperative programming in Coq. Using axioms, rather than Coq definitions, allows us to extract efficient code from our imperative Coq programs; this is discussed in Section 5.
Trace-based Verification of Imperative Programs
We begin by discussing how we define traces in Coq in Section 3.1 and use them to specify the protocol for a simple echo server. We then discuss how to build programs that meet a trace-based specification in Section 3.2 by implementing our echo server. In Section 3.3 we extend our specifications and implementations to operations over the heap, using a counter and pointer-swapping example. We then show how to enforce modularity in Section 3.4, giving an example abstract interface for a counter. We follow up in Section 3.5 by combining the counter with the echo server to obtain an echo server that uses memory to maintain an internal counter of how many times it has echoed anything; in this section we also walk-through the human-computer interaction to discharge the generated verification conditions. We conclude in Section 3.6 by describing how more complex protocols can be composed from simpler ones.
Traces
We begin by defining traces [5] in Coq. The first primitive in our library is a socket address:
In this paper we will mostly focus on networking Events, but we also include Events for file I/O. For simplicity, we will focus on UDP events, but we have also axiomatized TCP events.
As with SockAddrs, we could define Events rather than treating them axiomatically:
...
However, leaving Event abstract means that
Events form an open type [27] , so that users of our library can define additional I/O events without needing to modify the definition of Event. On the other hand, using an axiomatization like ours means that it is more complicated to perform explicit case analysis on Events.
We next define Traces to be a finite lists of Events:
This definition expresses that the empty trace is allowable (NilEchoes), and that if some trace past is allowable, then additionally echoing back a single request is also allowable (ConsEchoes). An alternative approach would be to use more sophisticated techniques, like temporal logics [11] , which we could define using parameterized Coq propositions.
Imperative Programs
We build implementations of our trace-based specifications using the Ynot library for Coq. We provide a library of networking commands that correspond to our primitive Events which users can use to build larger programs. The types of these commands use Traces to describe the effects that the commands have on I/O. Commands (also called imperative computations) have Cmd types; Cmd is analogous to the IO monad in Haskell and is indexed by pre-and post-conditions as in Hoare Type Theory [33] . In general, preand post-conditions can refer to the program's current trace and state of the heap; the post-condition is written as a function over the return value. Heaps themselves have type heap. We provide primitive commands to send a string along a socket connection, and to receive (recv) a string along a socket connection; the interface is given in Figure 2 .
The tr argument in the type of send is wrapped in [ ] braces to indicate that tr is computationally irrelevant, and should be erased by the compiler when an executable is generated. Explicitly marking arguments with braces drastically decreases the runtime overhead for verification-it would not be efficient to actually pass around the program trace at runtime. One minor side effect of this way of marking computational irrelevance is inside tr has type Trace. This explicit unpacking ensures that the Coq type checker will prevent irrelevant parameters from being used to influence runtime behavior. Further details can be found in our previous work on Ynot [10] .
The assertions that index a Cmd connect our programs to their specifications. For example, the type of imperative commands that conform to the previously defined echo protocol is: The [] notation in the pre-and post-conditions is overloaded here to indicate "pure" propositions that do not mention the heap. The * denotes the separating conjunction that we will explain in more detail in the next section. For now, the reader can consider it as similar to the standard classical conjunction. List concatenation is written ++. The ∃ r : Trace construct existentially quantifies variable r of type Trace. It is easy to see that this function's type guarantees that it respects (preserves) the echoes predicate (invariant) on Traces that we defined earlier. As such, any computation of this type when repeated forever (starting from an allowable initial state), is a correct implementation of an echo server. We can build an implementation of one echo iteration using the send and recv primitives, in a style that looks much like Haskell:
1 Definition echo ( local : SockAddr) : echo iter t local . As in Haskell, commands are sequenced through monadic binding. Intuitively, binding two computations c1 and c2 means running c1 and then running c2 using the result of c1 as input: we write this as v ← c1; c2, and as c1 ;; c2 when c1's output is ignored. Binding requires us to prove that the pre-condition of c2 is a logical consequence of the post-condition of c1. We will defer a discussion of how the correctness of this code is proved until later (Section 3.5), but for now note that we write imperative code first and then prove correctness afterward. The {{-}} on lines 4-5 indicates that the type of the final send may need its pre-condition strengthened and its post-condition weakened to match the overall type of echo iter t. In this example, the Coq tactic refine generates proof obligations that are all solved by a call to tactic rsep fail auto. The Proof and Qed statements delineate the proof script from the definition.
We have written out the intermediate state of the trace history (the fourth argument to send) using an irrelevant value unpacking operation~~~, similar to~~, but such states can often be inferred. Finally, the <@> notation corresponds to a use of separation logic's frame rule in which the framed heap is inferred. We will discuss this in more detail when we introduce how to reason about the heap in the next section.
Memory
In addition to performing I/O, Ynot programs can also manipulate memory. Heap memory is accessed through the traditional new, read, write, and free commands that we reason about using separation logic [40, 38] . The notation p → v represents the hprop that the pointer (ptr) p points to v in the given heap. The memory commands have types: 6 ( * SepRead is also written ! * ) 7 Definition SepRead (T : Set) (p : ptr) (P : T → hprop) :
10 ( * SepWrite is also written ::= * ) 11 Definition SepWrite (T T' : Set) (p : ptr) (v : T') :
For example, when SepNew is run in the empty heap with argument v, it returns a pointer 2 to v. SepFree is the inverse: it takes a valid pointer and frees it, hence the post-condition is the empty heap. Note that SepFree's type does not mean that the entire heap is empty, only that the portion of the heap referred to by the pre-condition is empty -this is characteristic of the small-footprint approach of separation logic. Pointers in Ynot are not explicitly typed, so the SepWrite function allows changing the type of the value pointed to by P. The * is separation logic conjunction, indicating that the heap can be split into two disjoint portions that satisfy each conjunct. SepRead's type indicates that to read p, p must point to some v; the additional parameter P can be used to dependently describe the heap around p, and P is passed v as an argument.
For example, the following program swaps the values of two pointers: The type of swap expresses that swap takes as arguments two pointers p1, p2 and two computationally irrelevant natural numbers n1, n2 such that p1 points to n1 and p2 points to n2. If swap terminates, then p1 will point to n2 and p2 will point to n1.
The swap function itself is similar to a typical pointer-swapping function but includes extra information to help us prove partial correctness. As we stated before, refine generates proof obligations, that we discharge using Ynot's built in separation logic tactic, using a call to sep inst auto [10] . We will once again defer describing this process, delaying it until we have seen an example with non-trivial obligations (Section 3.5). The <@> is a use of separation logic's frame rule, which allows us to describe the portion of the heap that a computation does not use. In this example, for instance, we need to know a framing condition that p2 points to n2 before and after p1 is read. This fact can actually be inferred automatically (and a similar condition is inferred on the next line), but we write it out here for sake of explanation.
The memory correctness properties of our implementation, such as absence of null pointer dereferences and memory leaks, are statically guaranteed at compile-time by the proofs required to invoke the Sep commands. For example, consider the following erroneous program:
1 Definition leak : Cmd empty (fun : unit ⇒ empty). Because the heap contains 1 after the call to New but the return type of leak states that the heap should be empty, refine generates the false obligation that a heap in which v points to 1 is also a heap that is empty:
We obtain a similar behavior with traces -if we try to give a command an erroneous trace, solving the proof obligations will fail.
Modularity
We achieve modularity in Ynot by defining abstract interfaces for imperative components. This is essential for reasoning about larger programs in a compositional way.
Consider the following interface and implementation of a simple stateful counter with an increment function, inc:
1 Module Type Counter. Here, the T parameter is the hidden type of the implementation, which corresponds to a pointer in the CounterImpl implementation. M is the exposed logical model for the data structure, in this case a natural number that is the current value in the counter. The rep parameter relates, through an hprop, the state of the imperative implementation to the logical model. The Module Type hides everything except the logical model, providing an abstraction barrier for users of the module. This is a classic example of an Abstract Data Type [28] .
Example: A Counting Echo Server
We can use the Counter module to implement a counting echo server. As is typical, we begin by defining a trace-based specification: This definition is similar to the plain echoes definition given before except that each trace is indexed by a natural number that corresponds to the number of echoes that have occurred. This number increases on each iteration.
The type of imperative computations that implement one iteration of this specification is: We can easily implement a computation that corresponds to this type: Unlike our previous examples, the proof obligations generated by the counting echo sever are non-trivial. A detailed discussion of how to discharge obligations effectively can be found in [10] ; here we simply want to give a flavor for how proving proceeds. The use of refine generates 8 subgoals, 7 of which can be discharged completely automatically by the tactic invocation rsep fail auto. After further simplification using sep fail auto and simplr, we are left with the following, somewhat messy, goal: Here we can see that hypothesis and variable names are machine-generated, as is common in automated proving. This obligation is stated as an assertion in separation logic: in an environment where echoes local x1 x0 holds, and the heap is empty, it must also be the case that the echoes predicate holds on the trace extended by x. This is true by definition of our echoes predicate, and we finish the proof by lifting the pure hprop echoes (using cut pure) and applying standard Coq tactics to reason: 1 simpl; cut pure ; constructor; eauto. The naïvely printed proof is two thousand lines long, but can be machine-checked almost instantaneously.
Application Servers
Many web systems, including our gradebook server, can be structured as computations that an application server executes repeatedly. Such web applications can be programmed using event loops in the style of dialogs [21] . At a minimum, an application iteration is defined by a progress-making, invariant-preserving Ynot command that is runnable in the initial world of an empty heap and empty trace: We have implemented a number of UDP, TCP, and SSL application servers. In each case their types ensure that they only run applications that preserve some notion of partial correctness. The simplest, the forever server, repeats a given computation forever. The implementation of forever is half a dozen lines, does not require a single line of manual proof, and includes the post-condition that the server never halts (the post-condition includes [False]):
Cmd (t'˜˜traced t ' * I t ') Ynot allows non-terminating recursion with an explicit Fix command shown on line 11. Since recursion invariants are generally not inferable, Fix takes the pre-and post-condition of the loop, lines 11 and 12, in addition to the function body, lines 14-16.
We have also implemented a generic HTTP server, that strips HTTP headers and passes the content on to applications. Its implementation is sketched in Figure 3 , and we will use it to deploy our gradebook application, discussed in the next section. 
The Gradebook Application
In this section we describe the gradebook application specification, our imperative implementation, and the proof that the implementation meets the specification. We begin with the purely functional specification of the gradebook itself (Section 4.1). We then describe the entire deployed application server starting from the backend and working toward the user. We start with the data store (Section 4.2) which provides the data manipulation operations we use in our imperative implementation (Section 4.3). From there, we show how the application can be deployed using our application server (Section 4.4). We conclude with an explanation of the frontend (Section 4.5) in which we focus on parsing user requests. It is helpful to keep in mind that every imperative component is related to a purely functional model to facilitate compositionality. A diagram showing the control flow of the gradebook is shown in Figure 4 .
Application Logic
In this section we define the specification of our application. We begin by defining the configuration of a course: We are using natural numbers for our basic types, but abstract types can also be used. Configurations are specified to have a number of properties; for example, all students, teaching assistants and professors must have a password and each student must belong to exactly one section. These properties are given by a Coq definition: 
The actual grades are modeled by a list (ID * list Grade).
As with the configuration, we define a predicate gb inv to ensure the integrity of the grade data. Among other things, this specifies that grade lists must always be the length of the maximums list given in the configuration, each grade must be less than or equal to the associated maximum permissible, and each student must have an entry.
The gradebook application manages a single course by processing user requests, updating the grades if necessary, and returning a response. The available commands are given by a Coq data type:
The meaning of a request is given by a pure Coq function mutate that maps a Request, Config, and list (ID * list Grade) to a new list (ID * list Grade) and one of the following responses: and ERR BADGRADE if the user requests the grade for an assignment that does not exist. We use OK to denote a successful update and RET to return a value to the user in response to a GetGrade or Average request.
The fifth response type, ERR NOINV, simplifies our definition of the mutate function. Technically, mutate is partial, i.e. it is only meaningful when the gradebook invariant gb invs holds on the gradebook data. ERR NOINV is the default return value that we use when mutate is applied to data that does not represent a gradebook. In our implementation we prove that our gradebook implementation always respects gb inv, but "over-defining" mutate in this way makes it easier to use with our other components. The full specification is given in Figure 5 .
The function private is meant to decide whether or not a given request respects the privacy policy. By guarding the body of mutate with the private test, it is easy to see that our specification enforces privacy. However we can also easily prove properties about our policy to reassure ourselves that we encoded it correctly.
Privacy is enforced using role based access control described by the table in Figure 6 . The policy is defined by the Coq predicate private also given in Figure 6 . We have proven a number of theorems about our specification, for example that mutate preserves gb inv and do not return ERR NOINV when gb inv holds. To help make the proofs more tractable, we implemented a number of automated proof search tactics tailored to this model.
Data Store
The backend data store of the gradebook server is a simplified relational database. We first give a functional specification of the store, and then prove that our imperative implementation meets this specification. Logically, a Store is modeled by a list of Tuple n defined by the following Coq data type: For simplicity our data values are only natural numbers, and we specify only a small subset of the functionality of SQL, including select, update, project, and delete. For example, selection is modeled logically by: Our store loads grade data when the application starts, and saves grade data when the application stops. Starting and stopping is straightforward, so we do not discuss them in more detail. Correctness of persistence is reflected in the store interface by the requirement that serialization and deserialization are inverses: deserial ( serial tbl ) = Some tbl. We have implemented the store using an abstract list which has several possible implementations, including a C-style linked-list. The higher-order nature of Ynot makes it easy to express our store operations using the list's effectful fold operation.
Verified Implementation
Based on the specification given in Section 4.1, a verified implementation of our gradebook meets the following interface:
1 Module Type GradeBookAppImpl.
2
Parameter T : Set. Note that the type guarantees that any implementation of exec is invariant preserving and faithfully models mutate. For convenience, we keep the course configuration in memory at runtime, and parameterize our implementation by an abstract backend store:
1 Module GradeBookAppStoreImpl (s : Store) : GradeBookAppImpl. In trying to write rep, we immediately encounter an impedance mismatch between our logical gradebook model (based on list (ID * list Grade)) and the table based model of the store (based on Tuples). Following the 3-tier web application model, we define an object-relational mapping [23] between the domain-specific objects of students, grades, etc., and the relational store:
1 Module GradesTableMapping. end. 18 End GradesTableMapping.
The return annotation on line 3 expresses the relationship between n and the resulting type of the match and is necessary for helping the Coq type checker. Other data models, such as with three-tuples (id, assignment, grade), require different mappings, but, regardless of the choice of data model and mapping, we must prove that the mapping is an isomorphism from the logical model to the data model:
Table2List
( List2Table l (length ( totals c))) = l.
Isomorphism is actually an overly strong requirement, but it helps simplify reasoning. The store inv1 predicate on line 1 captures when the isomorphism applies (e.g., when the length of the store's list of tuples is the same as the number of assignments).
With the mapping to the data model done, we can define the concrete imperative representation:
The imperative implementation consists of a runtime configuration cfg and a handle to an imperative store t, which rep relates to the logical gradebook model. The rep predicate states that the runtime configuration (cfg) is identical to the logical model's configuration (cfg'), and that the imperative gradebook's state (t) is related to the logical model (List2Table gb) by the isomorphism we defined previously. The complete imperative implementation consists of hundreds of lines of code, proofs, and tactics, so we can only give highlights here. The implementation of retrieving a grade, omitting some definitions, is:
1 Definition F get user pass id assign m t : The intuition here is that we first run a get query over the store s (lines 8-10), which results in a table res. Because the gradebook invariant holds, res contains a single tuple of the requested student's grades. nthget returns None if the input table is empty, so we mark this branch as impossible (using the !!! command). We then project out the desired grade, returning an error if the requested assignment does not exist. The proof script for this function is almost completely automated and consists almost entirely of appeals to Ynot's built-in separation logic tactic sep augmented with heuristics that apply purely logical lemmas about the application model. For example, a typical proof about the specification is: This theorem states that if the get request is privacy respecting:
1 private ( fst x) (GetGrade user pass id assign ) = true and the invariant holds on the store: 1 store inv (snd x) ( fst x) = true then the student has a grade:
1 nthget assign ( select (get query id ( fst x)) 2 ( List2Table (snd x) (length ( totals ( fst x ))))) <> None
The other grade-manipulating operations are implemented analogously.
Deploying to an Application Server
To deploy our application using a read-parse-execute-pretty-print application server we have developed we must wrap our implementation in an App module:
1 Module Type App. ( * * the functional model of the application * )
10
Parameter func : Q → M → (R * M).
11
Parameter appIO : Q → M → (R * M) → Trace. This interface requires a functional application model (func), and allows the application to transparently perform I/O operations by wrapping the desired sequence in the appIO trace. The gradebook application only performs I/O on startup and shutdown, and so it meets this interface trivially. (Of course, the application server itself performs much more I/O). The application server also requires a parser and frontend that are defined by the following functions and are discussed in the following subsection: Parameter parser : parser t grammar.
3
Parameter printer : R → string.
4
Parameter err : parse err t → string. 5 End App.
With these definitions in place, we can describe the traces of a correct application implementation, which we do using an inductive data type in the same way we specified correctness for the counting echo server (Section 3.5). Intuitively, either the input request parsed correctly, and the result was sent to the application for processing and the response returned to the user, or the parse failed and an error was returned; see Figure 4 .
Frontend
The frontend parses inputs into Requests and converts application Responses into text. For example, we have implemented a raw-sockets frontend by straightforwardly parsing Requests and printing Responses. We have also implemented an HTML frontend as an application server (transformer). Given an application, the HTML application server passes along certain HTTP fields to the application and converts response to HTML output. Several screen shots of the web application running with a minimal skin are given in Figure 7 . Here we use strings for user names, passwords and assignments which the backend supports through a lookup table that we omitted in our presentation. The HTTP server uses Ynot's packrat PEG parser toolkit [10] to parse HTTP requests. The parser is implemented as a verified compiler [31] : given a specification consisting of a PEG grammar and semantic actions, the parser creates an imperative computation that, when run over an arbitrary imperative character stream, returns a result that agrees with the specification. To make the parsing efficient, the generated parser uses the packrat algorithm which implements a sophisticated caching strategy based on imperative hash tables to make the parser efficient. By structuring this module as a compiler, we can use it to write custom parsers for a wide variety of tasks. Figure 8 describes the breakdown of proofs, specifications, and imperative code in our verified components. Program code is Haskell-ish code that has a direct analog in the executed program (e.g. F get). Specs are model definitions but not proofs (e.g. gb inv). Proofs counts all proofs (e.g. select just) and tactic definitions. Overhead gives the ratio of proofs to program code and the time column indicates proof search and checking time on a 2Ghz Core 2 laptop with 2GB RAM. We have made no attempt to optimize any of these numbers. These totals do not include the base Ynot tactics and data structures that we use, which include an imperative hash table, stream, and segmented linked list.
Verification Overhead
The ratios of overhead vary, but the application stands out as having the largest proof burden. This is primarily because we opted to directly reason about sets as permutationequivalence classes of ordered lists which have no duplicate elements, instead of using a set library like [15] . As a result, details of our set implementation have complicated our proofs. We found that in general, Ynot's separation logic tactics were able to successfully isolate reasoning about the heap, reducing the problem of verification to a straightforward but non-trivial Coq programming task. For a more detailed discussion of engineering proofs with Ynot, see [10] . 
Extraction
Our axiomatic treatment of imperative commands facilitates reasoning but does not allow us to actually run programs. In order to produce executable code, we must translate our Coq code into a runnable language in which we can realize our imperative axioms. Coq provides such an extraction mechanism [26] for translating Coq code into OCaml, Haskell, and Scheme; in our work we chose OCaml.
Coq extraction consumes well-typed Coq terms and produces OCaml terms. Because the Coq type system is so much more expressive than the OCaml type system, extraction makes heavy use of unsafe casting, written Obj.magic. However, because we know that our Coq program is well-typed, and hence "cannot go wrong", we know that all of these casts are actually safe.
Extraction produces OCaml code with calls to undefined functions that correspond to our axioms, e.g. SepRead, SepWrite, etc.. Therefore, in order to run our program, we must implement these functions. The Ynot library declares 11 axioms for reasoning in the Cmd monad. These are realized in OCaml and reused for all Ynot developments that extract to OCaml. In OCaml, type variables always have primes and type application places arguments before functions, so the type 'a F indicates the type constructor F applied to type variable 'a: These axioms are defined at the non-separation logic (raw heap) level, and the corresponding lower-level monad is called ST instead of Cmd. Ynot implements the Cmd monad on top of the ST monad in Coq. Our Coq computations correspond to OCaml thunks, which are effectful computations suspended inside of lambdas. The bind and return operations have standard definitions. Contradiction is implemented by raising a runtime exception, but this operation can never be called because the Coq axiom can only be used in provably dead code. Weaken and Strengthen correspond to strengthening preconditions and weakening post-conditions, and they are no-ops because they are only used to reason about correctness. The general-recursive Fix combinator has the standard definition for a call-by-value language. Finally, we implement the heap operations using OCaml references. Since Ynot pointers are untyped and support strong-update, we model ptr as a reference to Obj.t which is OCaml's equivalent to C's void*. New returns a new reference and free is a no-op since OCaml is garbage collected. Finally, Read and Write have standard definitions based on reading and writing references in OCaml.
In addition to the Ynot core, our axiomatization of traces also requires an OCaml realization. We need to give computational definitions for axioms involving files, server sockets, and UDP, TCP, and SSL sockets. In total, this basis includes 23 definitions that are mostly modularly defined on top of our file abstraction. The file abstraction provides basic operations, like read, write, flush, and close, and are implemented for each type of file and persistent socket. The implementation for regular Unix files is:
1 ( * * File Interface * * ) 2 type file descriptor = { Having realized all of the required axioms, we can compile our code with the OCaml compiler. The generated code derives its correctness from the Coq type checker, the Coq extraction mechanism, the realization of the computational axioms just presented, the correctness of the OCaml compiler and libraries (including the system calls that they use), and the soundness of our Ynot extensions. While this is still a considerable amount of code to trust, it is also possible to verify these lower-level components [14, 4] . The soundness of the Ynot axioms is discussed in [39] .
Related Work

Weaker notions of correctness
Our approach to building verified web systems is to prove them correct by construction at development time. Alternatively, pre-existing applications can be verified to be free of certain errors through static analysis. In [19] , for example, the authors rule out SQL injection attacks for a large fragment of PHP using an information flow analysis to ensure that tainted application inputs are never used in SQL queries. Their notion of correctness is the absence of certain classes of errors; with Ynot we can prove correctness with respect to an arbitrary logical model of application behavior, which may itself specify the absence of injection attacks. And although we have specified our logical gradebook model in Coq, specifications can be developed using special-purpose tools such as Alloy [20] . Moreover, in Ynot, reasoning is modular and compositional: interfaces themselves guarantee correctness properties; in [19] , the entire program must be analyzed. See [9] for a discussion of how a wide range of correctness properties can be obtained with minimal effort using a dependent type theory such as Coq.
Alternative Approaches to Full Verification
Interest in the full verification of higher-order imperative software has surged recently [25] , and in this section we highlight several alternative verification methodologies and other verified software case studies.
Jahob [44] is similar to Ynot. It allows users to write effectful Java code, which is automatically verified against a programmer specified logical model by a combination of automated theorem provers. Although Jahob is also based on a Hoare logic, it does not use separation logic for reasoning about memory and requires a significantly larger trusted code base than Ynot. Moreover, Jahob cannot be used to reason about I/O behavior. To the best of our knowledge, Jahob has never been used to certify a system like ours.
The Isabelle/HOL [36] proof assistant can be used to verify higher-order imperative programs. In [8] , the authors verify an array-based checker for resolution proofs and a bytecode verifier using an approach similar to our own. However, our work differs in several key respects. First, our work in based on Hoare type theory, so the types of imperative computations specify their behavior. Because Isabelle/HOL lacks dependent types, it is difficult to parameterize a computation monad by pre-and post-conditions, and as a result, the authors must use an explicit operational semantics to reason about imperative computations "after the fact". For example, using Ynot notation, the type of a pointer-swapping function in [8] would be:
1 swap : ptr → ptr → Cmd unit Many of the correctness properties that come for free in Ynot, such as the prevention of array indexing out of bounds, must be explicitly proved (without built-in support for separation logic) using Isabelle/HOL. As such, if we are interested in these properties, more effort is required to establish them, but if we are not interested in these properties, then in Isabelle/HOL we are not obligated to prove them. Another key difference between [8] and our work is the expressivity of the underlying language and logic: the programming language of [8] is restricted to storing first-order values in the heap and its logic cannot be used to reason about I/O behavior. Ynot allows higher-order values and imperative computations to be stored in the heap; see [42] for an approach that allows higher-order values, but not computations, to be stored in the heap.
Isabelle/HOL has been used to verify a number of software systems. In [41] , the authors verify a concurrent OCaml implementation of a distributed queue running the alternating bit protocol. Their development is similar in spirit to ours, but differs in scale -our development is 800 lines of code and 2000 lines of specification and proof, and the queue is 3000 lines of code and 3000 lines of specification and proof. Our development can be verified in several minutes; the queue takes an hour. Isabelle/HOL has also been used to verify the seL4 microkernel [24] , but the verification overhead is on the order of 20x, with a 200,000 line proof of correctness. A distinguishing feature of Ynot is its focus on lightweight proof automation, for separation logic in particular, which is discussed in [10] .
ACL2 [22] is a first-order applicative language and proof assistant used in a variety of industrial settings, often to verify hardware. Unlike Coq, ACL2 does not output separately checkable proof terms (and hence has a larger trusted base than Coq). An extension of ACL2, dubbed single-threaded objects [6] , allows one to write a restricted class of imperative programs and reason about them as though they were purely functional. This allows for large speed ups when, e.g, lists may be destructively modified in place. Indeed, the motivation for the single-threaded objects extension is to increase the speed of the prover, rather than allow users to program in an unrestricted imperative style. Programs that use imperative state must obey syntactic restrictions that guarantee that there is only one reference to any stateful object. It is unclear if this methodology can be pushed to a setting as general as ours, but an extension to Ynot that allows for "safe" computations (e.g., factorial) to be executed during type-checking would be useful.
Program Derivation from Specifications
Declarative networking [29] is an approach to building distributed systems by generating them from protocol descriptions written in domain specific languages based on Prolog. Realistic protocols written in this style are often remarkably concise, and they can also be reasoned about using techniques from automated theorem proving [43] . Our extended Ynot is a natural language choice for the code generated from such a system, as we could potentially prove that properties that hold at the declarative protocol level continue to hold in the generated code. See [43] for references on other approaches, besides theorem proving, to prove properties of declarative networking specifications. A similar line of work aims to extract concurrent programs from provable propositions in an extensional type theory [3] .
Conclusion
We learned a number of lessons in building our verified gradebook server. The first is the importance of the logical specification of application behavior. An imperative algorithm will be difficult to verify if its functional model is difficult to reason about. Although we have sketched the specification of our gradebook server in this paper, the properties that our implementation guarantees can only truly be understood by examining the Coq gradebook specification. Such guarantees also depend on lower level specifications. For example, our networking library does not capture timeout, retry, or filesystem behavior, making certain properties difficult or impossible to specify without modifying the I/O library. And because Hoare logic only captures partial correctness, the divergent computation is a verified implementation of every specification.
One possible future direction is to further refine the I/O library to take additional behaviors into account. Another direction is to integrate the gradebook with a more realistic relational database [17] . Finally, our server is single threaded but concurrency can be added to separation logic [7] and transactions can also be considered [32] .
